Coercive control entered New Jersey’s domestic violence statute on January 8, 2024, when A1475/S1809 was approved as P.L. 2023, c.230. It is now the seventh factor a Family Part judge must weigh under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) in deciding whether a final restraining order is necessary.
Where it sits in the statute matters more than most summaries of it suggest.
Coercive control is not a predicate act of domestic violence, and it is not a crime in New Jersey. It appears in the section of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act governing the necessity of a restraining order — not the section listing the offenses that can support one. Coercive control, standing alone, cannot satisfy the statutory requirement that an act of domestic violence be found or admitted before a final restraining order may be entered.
What coercive control does do is significant. Once a predicate act is established, evidence of a controlling pattern can weigh heavily on whether the court finds an order necessary, and depending on the offense alleged, it may also bear on how the court reads the predicate conduct itself.
This page explains the statutory text, where the factor fits within the Silver two-prong analysis, why coercive control is frequently confused with criminal coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5, and what the distinction means for someone facing these allegations in Bergen County.
Key Takeaway: New Jersey treats coercive control as a factor a Family Part judge must consider when deciding whether a final restraining order is necessary. It is not itself a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19, and it cannot independently satisfy the requirement that an act of domestic violence be found or admitted.
What Is Coercive Control Under New Jersey Law?
Coercive control is defined at N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7) as:
any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person’s liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights
Several elements of that language carry real weight.
“Any pattern.” The statute is directed at a pattern, not an incident. A single argument, a single restriction, or a single controlling remark is not what this provision addresses.
“In purpose or effect.” This is the broadest phrase in the subsection. The statute reaches conduct that has a controlling effect even where a controlling purpose is not established. Intent is not the only route.
“Liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights.” These are the interests the pattern must unreasonably interfere with, threaten, or exploit. The statute does not require physical harm.
“Unreasonably.” Not every restriction within a relationship qualifies. The statute builds in a reasonableness limit, and that limit is where most genuine disputes over these allegations are argued.
The provision also directs the court to specifically consider evidence of the need for protection from immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse — language that ties the coercive control factor back to the purpose of a restraining order rather than treating controlling behavior as harmful in the abstract.
Coercive control sits alongside six other factors. The complete list a court must consider under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) in assessing the necessity of an order is:
| # | Factor |
|---|---|
| 1 | The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse |
| 2 | The existence of immediate danger to person or property |
| 3 | The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant |
| 4 | The best interests of the victim and any child |
| 5 | In determining custody and parenting time, the protection of the victim’s safety |
| 6 | The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction |
| 7 | Any pattern of coercive control (added by P.L. 2023, c.230) |
The statute states the court “shall consider but not be limited to” these factors. They are mandatory considerations, not an exhaustive list.
Is Coercive Control a Predicate Act of Domestic Violence?
No. Coercive control is a statutory factor bearing on whether a restraining order is necessary. It is not one of the offenses that can serve as the underlying act of domestic violence.
The distinction is structural, and it runs through the whole of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19 contains the list of predicate acts — the criminal offenses that constitute domestic violence when committed against a protected person. The list runs from homicide and assault through terroristic threats, kidnapping, criminal restraint, false imprisonment, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, lewdness, criminal mischief, burglary, criminal trespass, harassment, stalking, criminal coercion, robbery, contempt of a domestic violence order, any other crime involving a risk of death or serious bodily injury, and cyber-harassment. Coercive control is not among them.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) governs what happens at the final restraining order hearing — the standard of proof, the factors the court weighs, and the relief available. Coercive control lives here, at paragraph (7).
The legislative record shows where the provision landed. A1475 was introduced under the title “Adds coercive control to definition of domestic violence,” and the introduced text would have inserted coercive control as item (20) on the predicate act list in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19. The bill did not pass in that form. Following Assembly committee amendments, the enacted bill carried the title “Requires court to consider information concerning coercive control in domestic violence proceedings,” and the enacted provision was placed in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) rather than N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19.
Some secondary descriptions of the 2024 legislation reflect the introduced version rather than the enacted statutory language. The current statute controls, and the text of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19 is the place to check.
Is coercive control a crime in New Jersey?
No. New Jersey has not created a standalone criminal offense of coercive control. P.L. 2023, c.230 amended the civil restraining order framework only. There is no charge of “coercive control” in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice.
Conduct described as coercive control may separately amount to a criminal offense — threats, stalking, harassment, or criminal coercion can each be charged in their own right. But the label itself carries no criminal penalty.
The Eight Categories of Coercive Control
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7) sets out eight categories of conduct that coercive control “may include, but shall not be limited to.” The list is illustrative rather than a checklist, and the closing category is deliberately open-ended.
| Category | Statutory language | What the provision addresses |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Isolating the person from friends, relatives, transportation, medical care, or other source of support | Conduct that cuts off a person’s connections and independent means of getting help — including access to transportation and medical care, not only social contact |
| (b) | Depriving the person of basic necessities | Withholding the essentials a person depends on, such as food, shelter, clothing, or medical care |
| (c) | Monitoring the person’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services | Surveillance in its broad sense — location, phone and message activity, spending, and control over what services a person can reach |
| (d) | Compelling the person by force, threat, or intimidation, including threats based on actual or suspected immigration status | Forcing conduct through pressure, with immigration status expressly named as a form of leverage |
| (e) | Threatening to make or making baseless reports to the police, courts, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP), the Board of Social Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), or other parties | Use of state agencies as leverage through reports the statute describes as baseless — the falsity of the report is central to this category |
| (f) | Threatening to harm or kill the individual’s relative or pet | Pressure applied through threats to third parties or animals rather than to the person directly |
| (g) | Threatening to deny or interfere with an individual’s custody or parenting time, other than through enforcement of a valid custody arrangement or court order | Use of children as leverage — with an express carve-out for enforcing a valid order, which is not coercive control |
| (h) | Any other factors or circumstances that the court deems relevant or material | A catch-all leaving the category open to conduct the statute does not specifically describe |
Three features of this list matter for anyone responding to such an allegation.
Category (e) turns on baselessness. The statute does not treat contact with police, DCPP, or other agencies as coercive control. It addresses reports that are baseless. Whether a report had a genuine foundation is a factual question, and it is frequently a live one.
Category (g) contains an express exception. Enforcing a valid custody arrangement or court order is expressly excluded. A parent who insists on the terms of an existing order is doing something the statute carves out, not something it captures.
Category (h) has no defined boundary. Because the closing category is open-ended, the practical limits come from the opening language of paragraph (7) — the requirement that there be a pattern, and that it unreasonably interfere with the interests the statute names.
How Coercive Control Fits Into the Final Restraining Order Analysis
New Jersey courts decide whether to enter a final restraining order using the two-step analysis set out in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125–27 (App. Div. 2006). Locating the coercive control factor requires keeping those two steps separate.
Prong one — did a predicate act occur? The plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the defendant committed one or more of the predicate acts listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19. This is a question about specific conduct measured against the elements of a specific offense.
Prong two — is a restraining order necessary? If a predicate act is established, the court then determines whether an order is necessary to protect the victim from immediate danger or to prevent further abuse. The New Jersey Supreme Court described this step in J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475–76 (2011), as an evaluation of the factors set out in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).
As a statutory factor, coercive control operates within the second-prong necessity analysis. It does not itself establish the predicate act required at the first prong.
Can the same evidence matter at both prongs?
It can, and whether it does depends on the predicate offense alleged and the facts of the case.
The two prongs are analytically distinct, but they are not evidentiary silos. Silver directs courts to assess the alleged predicate act in light of the parties’ prior history, and factor (1) of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is that history. More importantly, some predicate offenses have elements that evidence of a controlling pattern may bear on directly:
- Harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 requires a purpose to harass. Evidence about the surrounding course of dealing between the parties may be relevant to whether that purpose existed.
- Stalking under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10 requires a course of conduct. Evidence of repeated conduct may bear on that element.
- Criminal coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 requires a purpose to unlawfully restrict another’s freedom of action, which is closely related to what the coercive control factor describes.
By contrast, where the alleged predicate act is a discrete physical offense such as simple assault, evidence of a controlling pattern is far less likely to bear on the elements, and its relevance will usually be confined to the necessity analysis.
The point is not that coercive control evidence is walled off from prong one. It is that coercive control is not itself a predicate act, and evidence of a pattern cannot substitute for proof of the offense actually alleged. Whether such evidence is admissible and probative on a particular element is a question decided offense by offense, on the facts.
One further point of precision: J.D. v. M.D.F. was decided in 2011 and describes the second prong by reference to factors (a)(1) through (a)(6), because paragraph (7) did not exist until 2024. Coercive control is now part of the same statutory list the case law directs courts to evaluate, but the body of published decisions applying it is still developing, and its interpretation should not be treated as settled.
Can a New Jersey Court Enter a Final Restraining Order Based Only on Coercive Control?
No. A final restraining order requires a finding that a predicate act of domestic violence occurred. Coercive control, standing alone, cannot supply that finding.
The statutory basis is direct. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) provides that an order under the Act “shall only restrain or provide damages payable from a person against whom a complaint has been filed under this act and only after a finding or an admission is made that an act of domestic violence was committed by that person.”
“An act of domestic violence” means one of the predicate acts enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19. Because coercive control is not on that list, it cannot satisfy this requirement, however extensive the alleged pattern.
Legal Services of New Jersey reaches the same conclusion in its guidance for people seeking restraining orders, advising that testimony should focus primarily on the most recent acts of domestic violence, because a court cannot enter a final restraining order on coercive control alone.
The practical structure follows:
- Without an established predicate act, the case fails at prong one. Coercive control evidence does not rescue it.
- With an established predicate act, coercive control becomes relevant — potentially decisively — to whether an order is necessary at prong two.
This is not a technicality. It defines what the hearing is about. A response to these allegations that engages only with the controlling-behavior narrative, and never tests whether the predicate offense was proven, has skipped the question the statute asks first.
What Findings Must a Judge Make?
The coercive control provision contains its own findings requirement, written into the statute:
If the court finds that one or more factors of coercive control are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached that conclusion.
This sits on top of the general obligation under Rule 1:7-4(a) for a court to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The requirement matters for three reasons.
It forces specificity. A court that weighs the eight categories unevenly must explain why. That converts what might otherwise be a general impression about a relationship into identified findings tied to identified conduct.
It creates a record. Findings are what an appellate court reviews. New Jersey courts have long emphasized that inadequate findings impede meaningful appellate review; Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569–70 (1980), describes the failure to make explicit findings as a disservice to the litigants and to the appellate court.
It applies to a developing area. Because published decisions applying paragraph (7) remain limited, the written findings made in individual cases carry more weight than they might in a settled area of law.
An important limit: a deficiency in a court’s findings does not automatically vacate a final restraining order. Appellate courts have a range of responses available, including remanding for fuller findings rather than reversing. Whether a findings issue has any appellate value depends entirely on the record and the specific deficiency. Anyone considering an appeal from a final restraining order should have the record reviewed rather than assume a procedural gap is dispositive.
Coercive Control vs. Criminal Coercion
These two concepts are routinely conflated. They are different provisions, in different parts of the law, with different consequences.
| Issue | Coercive control | Criminal coercion |
|---|---|---|
| Legal provision | N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7) | N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 |
| Role in domestic violence law | A factor the court must weigh in deciding whether a final restraining order is necessary | A predicate act — one of the offenses listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19 that can support a domestic violence finding |
| Predicate act? | No | Yes |
| Criminal offense? | No — not a crime in New Jersey | Yes — a crime of the fourth degree, or of the third degree where the threat is to commit a crime more serious than one of the fourth degree or the actor’s purpose is criminal |
| Court context | Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part | Superior Court, Criminal Division — and relevant in the Family Part when alleged as a predicate act |
| Standard of proof | Preponderance of the evidence, within the restraining order analysis | Beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution |
| Typical legal significance | Can support a finding that an order is necessary, once a predicate act is established | Can independently establish the act of domestic violence, and carries criminal exposure |
The core difference: criminal coercion can carry a case; coercive control cannot. If criminal coercion is established, prong one of Silver is satisfied. If coercive control is shown but no predicate act is established, there is no basis for a final restraining order.
Our page on criminal coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 covers the elements and exposure of that offense in detail.
A comparable distinction applies to stalking under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. Stalking also involves a course of conduct rather than a single act, which invites confusion with coercive control — but stalking is a criminal offense and a predicate act, with defined statutory elements that must be proven. Pattern-based conduct is not automatically stalking, and it is not automatically coercive control.
Evidence That May Be Relevant to a Coercive-Control Allegation
Coercive control allegations are usually built from ordinary records of daily life rather than from a discrete incident. Categories that commonly become relevant include:
- Communications — text messages, chat threads, emails, voicemails, and social media exchanges
- Financial records — account access, transfers, joint account activity, and records of household expenses
- Location and movement records — phone location history, vehicle records, and app data
- Parenting-related communications — scheduling exchanges, co-parenting app records, and messages about custody or parenting time
- Records of contact with agencies — police reports, DCPP records, and other agency documentation, particularly where the baselessness of a report is at issue under category (e)
- Device and account records — evidence about who had access to which accounts and devices
- Testimony — from the parties and from witnesses with direct knowledge of the relationship
No item on this list proves coercive control on its own, and none disproves it on its own. Relevance and weight depend on the facts and on how the evidence fits the statutory language — whether it shows a pattern, and whether that pattern unreasonably interfered with the interests the statute identifies.
Two evidentiary realities shape these cases in particular.
Context usually matters more than any single item. A curated set of screenshots can present a conversation very differently from the complete thread. Full records frequently establish who initiated contact, what preceded a message, and whether an apparent restriction was mutual, agreed, or explained by circumstances the excerpt omits.
Authentication is a live issue. Digital evidence must be properly authenticated before it is admitted. Timestamps, metadata, account ownership, and the completeness of a record can all be examined.
What Should Someone Accused of Coercive Control Do?
The following is general information, not legal advice for any particular situation. Every case turns on its own facts.
Comply with every existing order, without exception. If a temporary restraining order is in place, its terms apply in full while the case is pending. Compliance is not an admission of anything.
Have no contact with the protected person in violation of an order. This includes indirect contact through friends, relatives, or social media, and it includes responding to messages the other person sends first. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b), purposely or knowingly violating a provision of an order entered under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act is a crime of the fourth degree where the conduct constituting the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense, and a disorderly persons offense in other cases. The New Jersey Judiciary’s own guidance for attorneys defending contempt cases notes that a protected person’s consent to contact is not a defense — the order must be obeyed until a court changes, rescinds, or dismisses it.
Preserve the complete record. Coercive control allegations rest on patterns, and patterns are established or challenged through complete records. Back up entire message threads rather than excerpts. Retain financial records, calendars, location data, travel records, and parenting-time communications.
Do not delete anything. Deleting messages or records can constitute obstruction, can be read as consciousness of guilt, and frequently destroys the context that would have helped. This applies even to material that seems unhelpful.
Write a dated timeline while events are fresh. Specific dates, locations, and the sequence of events are difficult to reconstruct later, and are often what turns a general denial into a testable account.
Do not discuss the case publicly or attempt to explain yourself to the other party. Statements made to the other party, to mutual acquaintances, or on social media routinely become evidence. The impulse to correct the record directly is understandable and consistently counterproductive.
Understand which proceeding you are in. A restraining order case and a criminal charge are separate matters, with different courts, different burdens of proof, and different consequences. They frequently proceed at the same time. Our overview of New Jersey domestic violence defense explains how the two tracks operate.
Get advice before the final hearing, not after. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a), the hearing is to be held within 10 days of the filing of the complaint. That is the window for gathering records, identifying witnesses, and preparing.
Coercive Control and Criminal Charges
A coercive control allegation is an allegation about a pattern. It is not, by itself, a criminal charge, and it is not evidence that any crime was committed.
In practice, coercive control allegations often arrive alongside an alleged predicate act, because the statute requires one before an order can issue. That predicate act may also be charged criminally — most often as assault, harassment, terroristic threats, or stalking. Where that happens, two proceedings run in parallel: the restraining order case in the Family Part, and the criminal case in municipal court or the Superior Court, Criminal Division.
The two are decided under different standards. A final restraining order requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. A criminal conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. An allegation is not a conviction, and an order entered under the civil standard does not establish criminal guilt.
The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act contains a protection that is directly relevant when both proceedings are pending. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) provides that where a criminal complaint arising out of the same incident has been filed, testimony given by the plaintiff or defendant in the domestic violence matter shall not be used in the simultaneous or subsequent criminal proceeding against the defendant — other than in domestic violence contempt matters, and where the testimony would otherwise be admissible hearsay under the rules governing an unavailable party.
That protection is meaningful, and its exceptions are meaningful too. Coordinating the two proceedings, rather than treating them as separate problems, is a core part of defending a domestic violence allegation.
Coercive Control Allegations in Bergen County and Hackensack
Where a restraining order case is heard is set by statute, not by preference. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) requires the hearing to be held in the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court in the county where the ex parte restraints were ordered, within 10 days of the filing of the complaint, unless good cause is shown for it to be held elsewhere.
For anyone served with a temporary restraining order issued in Bergen County, that means the final hearing will be held in Bergen County. The Bergen Vicinage sits at the Bergen County Justice Center, 10 Main Street, Hackensack, and its Family Division — which handles domestic violence matters — can be reached through the vicinage at 201-221-0700.
Two practical consequences follow.
The ten-day window is short, and the nature of the allegation does not extend it. Coercive control allegations tend to require more preparation than single-incident cases, because the relevant records span months or years rather than one evening. Financial records, complete message histories, and parenting-time communications take time to assemble.
If the underlying conduct is also charged criminally, that case proceeds separately. Indictable charges go to the Superior Court, Criminal Division at the Justice Center. A disorderly persons charge is heard in the municipal court serving the municipality where the offense is alleged to have occurred — and Bergen County has 70 municipalities, some served by shared or joint municipal courts. The two tracks of a single case can therefore be heard in two different buildings.
The Law Offices of Ron Bar-Nadav is located at 58–60 Main Street in Hackensack, on the same street as the Justice Center. Ron Bar-Nadav has been admitted to the New Jersey bar since 1997, has practiced criminal defense exclusively for more than 25 years, and has been a member of the Bergen County Bar Association since 2000. For charges beyond domestic violence matters, our criminal defense practice in Hackensack covers the range of offenses heard in Bergen County.
If you have been served with a restraining order in Bergen County and the complaint alleges a pattern of controlling behavior, the first useful question is not whether the relationship was controlling. It is whether a predicate act of domestic violence has been established — because under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a), that finding is what a final restraining order requires.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. What statute covers coercive control in New Jersey?
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7), part of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. It was added by P.L. 2023, c.230, approved January 8, 2024.
2. Is coercive control a crime in New Jersey?
No. New Jersey has not created a criminal offense of coercive control. It is a factor a Family Part judge considers in deciding whether a final restraining order is necessary. Specific conduct described as coercive control may still constitute a separate criminal offense, such as harassment, stalking, terroristic threats, or criminal coercion.
3. Can a restraining order be granted for coercive control alone?
No. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) permits an order only after a finding or admission that an act of domestic violence — a predicate act listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19 — was committed. Coercive control is not a predicate act.
4. What are the eight categories of coercive control under New Jersey law?
Isolation from support; deprivation of basic necessities; monitoring of movements, communications, behavior, finances, or access to services; compelling conduct by force, threat, or intimidation including immigration-based threats; making or threatening baseless reports to agencies such as police, DCPP, or ICE; threatening to harm a relative or pet; threatening to interfere with custody or parenting time other than by enforcing a valid order; and any other circumstances the court finds relevant.
5. How does coercive control affect a final restraining order hearing?
It applies at the second step of the Silver analysis, where the court decides whether an order is necessary. Once a predicate act is established, evidence of a controlling pattern can weigh in favor of finding an order necessary. Depending on the offense alleged, such evidence may also bear on elements of the predicate act itself.
6. Does a judge have to explain findings about coercive control?
Yes, in defined circumstances. If the court finds that one or more coercive control factors are more or less relevant than others, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7) requires specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining that conclusion.
7. What is the difference between coercive control and criminal coercion?
Criminal coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 is a criminal offense and a predicate act that can independently support a domestic violence finding. Coercive control under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7) is neither a crime nor a predicate act — it is a factor in the necessity analysis.
This page is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Laws and procedures change, and every case is different. For advice about your specific situation, consult a licensed New Jersey attorney.